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The World Debt Crisis: Working Out Solutions
by James B. Burnham

1985 Free Market Calendar
A Daily Chronicle Of Enterprise
In a joint venture project with Louver Manufacturing
Company (Lomanco) of Jacksonville, Arkansas, the

Harding University

Students

in

Free

Enterprise

Economics Team has launched a major six months
project: "The 1985 FREE MARKET CALENDAR Daily Chronicle of Enterprise."

A

A calendar is a record of days past and days to come.
Since the ancient Egyptians first devised calendars to
tabulate the inexorable passage of time, men's lives have
been regulated by its pages. Each day, each month is a
milestone in the passage from youth to old age. Each
week holds its promise of struggle and reward, of ideas
achieved and triumphs won. But more than this, the
FREE MARKET CALENDAR is the record of the
progress of our nation and its people, of mankind's
onward march through the centuries to economic
freedom and greater material blessings.
The 1985 FREE MARKET CALENDAR offers not
only room to jot down notes of daily affairs but also 365
brief reminders of great enterprising events and relevant
comments on the idea of freedom applied to the
marketplace. One will enjoy recalling and com·
memorating the stirring events, and the great men and
ideas behind them, which have been the basis for
history's greatest economic miracle American
Capitalism.
Printed in blue and red ink on which stock, the 1985
FREE MARKET CALENDAR is punched for hanging
aild measures 11" x 14" folded or 22" x 14" unfolded.
The National Federation for Independent Business
(NFIB) has been reprinting portions of our calendar in
their FORUM and INSIGHT publications. A limited
amount of copies are available for St.SO to cover printing, postage, handling costs.

I would like to start with a quotation that I find
helpful in understanding the general issue of international debt and the immediate problem facing us. It
is from a World Bank Annual Report, and it reads as
follows:
It must not be forgotten that if there was bad
borrowing ... there was also bad lending. And there
was also reckless competition, encouragement was
sometimes given to borrowers and lenders alike
without sufficient understanding of what was involved; loans were often made for unproductive
purposes; sufficient care was not always exercised to
see that a loan was used for the purpose for which it
was granted; and high interest rates, instead of encouraging investors to inquire into the likelihood that
the borrower could meet his obligations, failed to do
anything but encourage them to invest their money. It
is important that there should be in the future a
greater sense of responsibility both in borrowing and
lending than has frequently been the case in the past.
As I mentioned, the quotation is from a World Bank
Annual Report: the date is 1947. What was being
discussed was the legacy of over-borrowing and overlending that had taken place in the 1920s, actions which
subsequently imposed tremendous burdens on the
developing world as well as on parts of Eastern Europe.
In the 1940s and 1950s the World Bank was striving to
reestablish the credit-worthiness of the developing
countries, mainly in Latin America. That is what, in
large measure, we are trying to do today as well. What we
are going through now, therefore, is not an unprecedented situation. And it could be that some of the
lessons we are supposed to learn today are the same ones
that should have been learned more than fifty years ago.
Let me start with a capsule analysis of how we got to
today's situation. The world credit crisis is a legacy of the
inflation of the 1970s, an inflation that encouraged overborrowing and over-lending. It is not just a question of
over-borrowing in the case of developing countries, but
also over-borrowing for energy development or for real
estate in the developed countries as well. Indeed, I think

write-offs of such domestic lending are going to exceed
what is likely to take place in terms of international
loans. The basic point is that double-digit inflation and
negative real interest rates in the 1970s led to overleveraged balance sheets for everyone - whether it was
individuals, businesses, or entire countries. Today we are
struggling to readjust everyone's balance sheets to a new
reality, the reality of lower inflation and lower expectations about the future rate of price increases.

AVOIDING A GREAT-DEPRESSION-STYLE
FINANCIAL COLLAPSE
If the situation today is, in some respects, similar to
the 1930s and 1940s, do we need a Great Depression to
work our way out of the problem? Fortunately, the
answer is "no." We did learn something from the 1930s.
The policies developed to address current debt problems
fully recognize that we cannot afford a contraction of
money and credit - and the resulting deflation - such
as took place in the 1930s.

International Cooperation
For example, we have seen extraordinary examples of
assistance by the major finance ministries and central
banks around the world to indebted countries, combined
with repeated instances of cooperative efforts by commercial financial institutions. It sort of reminds me of
the old "Tinker-to-Evers-to-Chance" double-play
combination of the Chicago Cubs. Of course, every
situation we have encountered is different in some
respects. Hungary experienced the first major international debt-liquidity problem, although most
people did not notice it at the time. (I put Poland in a
somewhat different category.) In the case of Hungary,
the problem was precipitated by withdrawal of shortterm foreign deposits in the Hungarian central bank,
followed by a threat of imminent default. The Bank for
International Settlements, the central banker's bank,
stepped into the breach, followed by some other central
banks, and thus default of the Hungarian external debt
was averted.
Next, we had a Yugoslav crisis that was somewhat
similar. It was, in turn, followed by the Mexican crisis
which required a different type of solution. The U.S.
Treasury and the Federal Reserve were very intimately
involved in averting a Mexican default. We have now
moved on to Brazil and Argentina. We will also have
"work out" situations in Nigeria and the Philippines that
are going to be difficult and complex. Nonetheless, we
have an interlocking network of cooperation between the
central banks, the International Monetary Fund, the
World Bank (to a limited extent), the Bank for International Settlements and, most importantly of all, the
commercial banks.
The Effects of Economic Recovery
The second factor that I believe makes a repeat of our
experience in the 1930s unlikely is the very strong, broad,
and deep recovery in the United States. By now, nearly
all of us have experienced some impact of the high rate of

growth in the domestic economy. But from the
developing countries' point of view, the most important
aspect of this recovering is the tremendous increase in
U.S. imports that is taking place. In 1982, the U.S. ran a
slight surplus on its trade account with the non-oil,
developing countries - a little under S2 billion. In 1983,
we ran a deficit of about $12 billion with those same
countries. Thus, the swing in terms of foreign exchange
earnings for those countries was roughly $14 billion.
That massive swing in and of itself is one of the most
powerful factors in getting the international banking
system and the economies of developing countries back
into a healthier, more sustainable posture.
Some Pain is Part of the Cure
Let me next discuss some of the policy adjustments
that the International Monetary Fund and the World
Bank have required in these "workout" situations. I
believe that the IMF and the World Bank have received a
bad rap for asking these countries to adopt policies exchange rate devaluations, budget restraint, credit
growth limitations, and the like - that are supposedly
unduly harsh. The question is, "What is the alternative?" There really is no alternative to requiring these
countries to put their economic houses in order, because
if they do not do so today, they will have to do it twelve or
eighteen months from now. Delay will only make the
pain more intense.
On the positive side, I believe that the boat is being
righted in some of these countries. If you look at Eastern
Europe today, the economic growth and creditworthiness of a country such as Hungary has
significantly improved compared to the situation
eighteen months or two years ago. In the case of Mexico,
you can detect a sense of confidence returning to the
banking system, even though we recognize there is going
to be a medium-term rescheduling problem in that
nation (and elsewhere). Confidence in the system is
rebuilding.
Ad Hoc Solutions versus "Silver Bullets"
As I indicated, there are a lot of players in this current
financial situation. The International Monetary Fund is
the most visible and essential player. All parties look to
the IMF to provide a degree of coordination in any given
debt crisis. But the commercial banks are clearly a key
ingredient in this process as well. By and large, their
response has been quite positive. It has not always been
easy. But the fact is, we are seeing a joint sharing of the
costs of adjustment by the developing countries themselves, the commercial banks, the IMF, and indeed, the
central banks of some of the countries involved. The
whole exercise is an attempt to distribute the cost of
adjustment. Each case is unique; each requires a different combination of measures, a different formula for
burden-sharing that has to be worked out. The process is
"ad hoc but not disorderly," although it may appear to
be so from the outside.
Some people have pet schemes for what I call magic
"silver bullets." For example, they want the World Bank

to buy up the developing countries' debt and give the
commercial banks some type of paper in exchange. That,
to my mind, is the old approach of papering your way out
of the problem. I do not support that type of solution.
Fortunately, there seems to be less and less talk of ·that
type of "quick fix" today than there was a year ago.
Furthermore, I believe it would be a great mistake to try
to set up a new institution or a new financial instrument
to solve these problems. Any attempt to do so runs the
very real risk of only making the problem worse, as the
parties concerned "rest on their oars," waiting for a
Sugar Daddy to come along.
WORLD TRADE AND mE DEBT CRISIS
Protectionism and Debt
Repayment are hicompatible

It is highly relevant to say a few words about the trade
aspects of world debt problems. The recovery in the
United States a\ld our tremendous demand for imports
from abroad are very powerful positive factors in
working our way out of this situation. I believe genuinely
open trade is one of the most difficult issues facing us
today. People's attitudes about the benefits of freer trade
depend upon how it affects them - whether one is an
exporter, an importer, a consumer, a banker, or someone
facing competition from foreign suppliers. One of my
biggest complaints is that U.S. government trade
promotion policies seem to be concerned only with
exports. Certainly, exports are a very important part of
the general international economic system. In fact, as
U.S. Executive Director at World Bank, I actively encourage American firms to bid on World Bank projects.
But what about imports? Unless we import from the
developing countries, they will not have the dollars to pay
for our exports. Trade is a two-way street.
In general, funds are provided to nations either
through trade by importing, with the result that foreign
countries earn the dollars they need to buy our exports or it is done through foreign aid, by having Congress
appropriate money and lift it out of the pockets of
taxpayers. Most of us would agree that the preferable
situation is to have a voluntary, two-way process and not
to rely on foreign aid. Protectionism makes it difficult for
our trading partners to pay for our exports. As Murray
Weidenbaum and his associates at the Center for the
Study of American Business have shown, protectionist
interference with imports also imposes a large cost on the
American economy and the American consumer. In
1980, this cost was about $58 billion a year and was
passed on to consumers in the form of a "hidden tax"
included in the price of American goods and services.
In this regard, one of the things that the World Bank
is trying to do in working with developing countries is to
persuade them to adopt policies that liberalize their
import regimes and that do not discriminate against
imports of capital goods or raw materials coming from
abroad. In particular, we encourage fewer restrictions on
imports for those nations which need imported inputs for
their exports, in order to get the two-way street of trade
flowing more rapidly. The World Bank is making major

efforts in this regard, both in terms of its lending
program and in terms of the policy advice given to these
countries. But that process will not work if the United
States increases its barriers to imports from abroad.
Bilateral Blinders

I am also concerned that we have a tendency in the
U.S. to look at trade issues bilaterally. At a time such as
the present, when we are running a large trade deficit, we
tend to focus on the balance of trade with specific
countries, such as Brazil or Japan. If we do not like the
Japanese inroads into our economy, we go after the
Japanese. This is what I call "creeping bilateralism."
One of the great dangers in this approach to world trade
is that it involves the U.S. government more and more in
the commercial details of bilateral trade relationships.
We should leave such details to the private parties involved.
The alternative is the long-standing approach of
addressing trade issues on a multilateral basis. Large,
complex multilateral negotiations such as those conducted within the General Agreements on Tariffs and
Trade take a lot of time, of course. But they reduce the
potential for mischief that is inherent in bilateral
negotiations. Japan may be a special case, since.there are
some peculiar problems . involved in dealing with the
Japanese. Nevertheless, our basic ·objective should be to
draw the Japanese into a speedy, productive set of
multilateral negotiations. Negotiating meaningful
multilateral trade agreements is one of the major
challenges in international economic policy facing us in
the months and years ahead.
CONCLUSION

Let me conclude by· summarizing the current
situation. We have an economic recovery underway in
the U.S. that is strong and deep. The estimates for
economic growth in 1984 have been continually revised
upward over the last quarter of 1983 and the first quarter
of this year. The Japanese recovery is also strengthening.
The recovery in the United Kingdom, although weak,
has also strengthened somewhat. An improved worldwide economy is certainly a necessary part of working
our way out of the international debt situation.
It is also clear that economic growth is increasing in a
number of the developing countries. We tend to think
that all developing countries are in the same shape as
some ,of the poorer performing African ~onomies.
However, even in Africa, there are countries that do
fairly well. Botswana, in southern Africa, has a fairly
successful record. It has an open economy, and it has
been blessed with some great mineral resources - but so
have a number of other African countries. The secret of
Botswana's success is that it has encouraged foreign
investment and human capital to come in and cooperate
with the local authorities.

China is another interesting case. Chinese economic
growth has been extraordinary over the last several years.
That n~tion's foreign exchange reserves are now well

over $10 billion, and the country is running a substantial
trade surplus. China's progress is not the result of
massive amounts of foreign aid - it has received
practically no aid - but it has adopted market-oriented
policies that are encouraging individuals to work, to
save, and to invest. India also has had a very strong
economy over the last three or four years and will continue to be in good shape. Pakistan has made fairly good
progress in recent years, mainly as a result of adopting
good economic policy.

ditions which led to the present international debt crisis.
We must avoid the inflation that arises from excessively
easy monetary policies: there must be a continuing
resolve by our public policymakers around the world to
keep inflation under control. I believe that restraining
inflation is the single most important key to avoiding the
conditions that could lead to another international debt
crisis - and for preventing the 1984 World Bank Annual Report from being quoted fifteen years from now in
the same spirit and tone in which I cited the 1947 edition.

Still, complex problems persist. The debt situation for
countries such as Nigeria and the Philippines is going to
be difficult to work out. But I believe we have good
examples to guide the parties involved. The challenge
now is to avoid creating once again the economic con-

James B. Burnham is the U..S. Executive.Director at the World
Bank in Washington, D.C. This report was originally published
in June 1984 by the Center for the Study of American Business
at Washington University in St. Louis.
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